Patent Pools in the Light of Antitrust Regulations: A Comparative Analysis of India and the European Union

Abstract

The recent pandemic we faced has categorically underscored the tension between incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation protected under intellectual property rights and ensuring broad access to life-saving innovations and advanced technologies. This paper examines how patent pools as a collaborative arrangements which allowes multiple patent holders to license their patents as a package among themselves to remain functional and make it altogether more effective and how it has been dealt under antitrust regulations in India and the European Union (EU). It maintains the original comparative structure, highlighting how the pandemic prompted a re-evaluation of patent pooling as a mechanism to balance innovation incentives with public health needs. We analyze the core benefits of patent pools in mitigating patent thickets and fostering innovation, alongside their potential anti-competitive risks.

We then compare the regulatory approaches of the EU and India, noting how competition law in each jurisdiction affects the formation and operation of patent pools. The impact of COVID-19 on these regimes is emphasized, particularly how emergency circumstances led to adaptations in antitrust enforcement to facilitate collaboration. Real-world examples, including the WHO’s COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) and partnerships like Oxford–AstraZeneca and Pfizer–BioNTech, illustrate the practical challenges and outcomes of patent pooling during the pandemic. The discussion further explores how competition policy evolved or was tested in the pandemic’s wake, and how aligning antitrust policies with intellectual property rights can either hinder or promote innovation. The paper concludes with recommendations for policy reforms to encourage pro-competitive patent pooling and ensure that innovation and access advance in tandem.