



## Research and Publications on Competition Laws - A Study through Bibliometric Analysis

Amarendra Pattnaik<sup>†</sup>

School of Law, KIIT Deemed to be University, Bhubaneswar — 751 012, India

*Received: 29<sup>th</sup> August 2024; revised: 18<sup>th</sup> April 2025*

In a perfectly competitive market, prices are determined by the market forces of demand and supply. In this market structure, sellers are price takers, which benefits consumers. They get competitive prices, higher-quality products, better services, and a range of products to choose from. On the other hand, some sellers are greedy and want abnormal profit, which is not possible in a competitive market. Therefore, they try to distort the market forces in various ways. Cartel formation, misuse of dominance, mergers and acquisitions, and the use of anti-competitive practices are some of the means that they use for the purpose. This tendency is universal. To counter such anti-consumer practices, more than a hundred countries have enacted laws, and these laws are known as antitrust laws or competition laws. In this article, the author has delved into the research that has happened globally in the area of competition and antitrust. The author has sourced the publication data from the Scopus database and has used bibliometric analysis for this research work.

**Keywords:** Antitrust, Competition, Cartel, Collusion, Anti-Competitive Practices, Monopoly, Misuse of Patents

Adam Smith, in his book “Wealth of Nations,” coined the term “Invisible hand”. He used this metaphor to explain that, individuals while pursuing their vested interests, unintentionally contribute to social benefits and the public good. John Nash, in his famous Game Theory<sup>1</sup>, describes how market players make their moves to outsmart the actions of the competitors in the market. Fair competition and the absence of unfair business practices are the hallmarks of a good market. But the reality in many industries is far from fair. Often, to make abnormal profits and to dominate the market, sellers indulge in anti-competitive practices. There are many examples of big players in the market dominating the small players and, at times, forcing them to exit the market.<sup>2</sup> Industry associations have played a limited role in mitigating such unfair methods in the market, where big foreign corporations also operate<sup>3</sup>

Businesses no longer operate within the geographic boundary of a country. There is a big growth in MNCs which operate in multiple geographies. Their businesses are global, but the antitrust laws of a country are local. Many antitrust laws in their current form are not well placed to handle the complex global competition-related issues (Grossack, 1986). OPEC<sup>4</sup> countries forming cartels and jacking up prices where

the customers are across the globe is one such example. In the USA and the EU, most of the anti-trust cases are related to cross-border cartels.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, for the MNCs, complying with the antitrust laws of different countries is cumbersome.<sup>6</sup> Even the corporations of the UK faced challenges in dealing with the anti-trust laws of the USA.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, there is a need for an international anti-trust law that can address competition issues across geographies. The WTO, through its trade agreements, has been trying to create a global consensus on free and fair trade across the globe, but many of the developing countries are not ready for that, as they try to protect their industries which can't compete with global players on equal terms.<sup>8</sup>

Another important area of debate around fair competition is the patent laws. Some eight decades after the enactment of the Sherman Act in the USA, patents have remained the greatest single monopolistic device.<sup>9</sup> Big corporations invest money in R&D to innovate new products, buy patents from innovators, and share patents. Patents give these corporations long-term exclusivity and hence an advantage over their competitors. This raises a question about the primacy between patent and competition<sup>10</sup> This issue has been highlighted in the context of India<sup>11</sup> where the author explains the interplay between the Patents Act, of 1970 and the

<sup>†</sup>Email: apattnaik@kls.ac.in

Competition Act, of 2002. High pricing of medicines by pharma companies is a global issue, and it is because of the Patents and Antitrust laws have not been able to address this issue.<sup>12</sup> While in the USA, the courts have given primacy to IP Laws, in Europe, it is just the opposite.<sup>13</sup>

### **Discussion on Competition and Anti-competitive Practices**

The New York Times once quoted, "Even as Amazon became one of the largest retailers in the country, it never seemed interested in charging enough to make a profit. Customers celebrated, and the competition languished.<sup>14</sup> Amazon, the titan of e-commerce, has focused on growth, and not on profit and that has perfectly suited the aspirations of the investors. It has expanded to many related and also to some unrelated businesses. This has created a situation in which many competitors are dependent on it for some part of their business or the other. Amazon sells products at a wafer-thin margin, which is not possible for any other competitor because of its scale of operation. Though theoretically, strategies of Amazon do not allow fair competition in the market, the firm has escaped antitrust scrutiny and actions.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, Microsoft's clubbing of Internet Explorer with Windows OS, though apparently anti-competitive is actually not one as it promotes efficiency in the market without any exclusionary treatment to any customer.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, it is very important to discern whether a business strategy is meant for efficiency (pro-consumer) or it is anti-competitive (anti-consumer).

Predatory pricing is an anti-competitive strategy. One of the classic cases of predatory pricing was of Reliance Jio, one of the late entrants to the Indian telecom industry. The competitors of Reliance Jio took up the matter with the Supreme Court. However, the court ruled that the issue of predatory pricing comes into the picture only when the player has a dominant position in the market, where dominance is measured by the market share in the relevant market.<sup>17</sup> Though Game theory dictates that there is always a competitive move to counter the competition, in reality, many times the competitors are not well-placed to counter predatory pricing.<sup>18</sup>

Taking cognizance of such incidents in the market, more than 102 countries have enacted laws to prevent anti-competitive actions.<sup>19</sup> The scope of such laws varies from country to country.<sup>20</sup> These laws are

called antitrust laws or Competition Laws.<sup>21</sup> Canada was the first country to pass such a law in 1889 (Anti-Combines Act) followed by the USA - Sherman Act (1890) and Clayton Act (1912). Interestingly, there are some researchers who believe that the Sherman Act was passed because of the farmers' agitation against the Railways as they were charging high prices for the transport of farm products.<sup>22</sup> In India MRTP Act, of 1969 was enacted to restrict the formation of monopolies and to prevent restrictive practices. Restrictive practices mean business practices that restrict fair competition in the market. The Competition Act was enacted in 2002 and it superseded the MRTP Act. This new law is more encompassing and covers many new dimensions and facets of competition<sup>23-24</sup>, particularly the issue of dominance.<sup>25</sup>

Justice Altamas Kabir, who went on to become the Chief Justice of India, in an article said that one of the mandates of the Competition Act, 2002, is that the material resources of the State should not be concentrated in the hands of a few. He underscored that this mandate is in keeping with the provision of ensuring economic justice for every citizen of the country, as enshrined in the Constitution of India.<sup>26</sup> In a similar vein, it is said that both democracy and competition have consumer welfare as the esteemed goal.<sup>27</sup> The author goes on to say that in some countries, like the USA, anti-trust laws are considered as important and sacrosanct as the constitution.

Several countries have established institutions to enforce antitrust laws and to ensure fair competition in the market. In these laws, they have provisioned for financial penalties and even jail terms for anti-competitive acts in the market. Some laws also allow leniency to the accused based on some criteria. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) is one such institution. It probes into the complaints related to anti-competitive practices received from market participants and other stakeholders. CCI also takes suo moto cognizance of anti-competitive practices and initiates an inquiry. In 2012, CCI imposed a fine of 6307Cr (in Indian Rupees)<sup>28</sup> on a group of cement manufacturers and their trade association for collusion, which was anti-competitive and anti-consumer (Bhattacharjea & De, 2012).

Many countries also have sector-specific regulators, like the insurance regulator, banking regulator, education regulator, electricity regulator, etc. Since the jurisdiction of the antitrust regulator is

across sectors, at times it gets into loggerheads with other regulators.<sup>29</sup> For example, in India, there have been instances where CCI has got into conflict with the IRDA, RBI, and CERC, etc due to jurisdictional ambiguity. Therefore, there is a need for various regulators to work jointly to ensure fair competition in the market.

The book *Antitrust Paradox* by Robert Berk (1978) is one of the authoritative books on the subject, wherein he extensively covers the anti-competitive practices in the USA and how to deal with such practices<sup>30</sup> for the greater public interest. Antitrust laws are regulations that encourage competition by limiting the market power of any particular firm. This often involves ensuring that mergers and acquisitions don't overly concentrate market power or form monopolies,<sup>31</sup> as well as breaking up firms that have become monopolies (Becker, 1958). But such knee-jerk reactions many times are not warranted.<sup>32</sup> What is needed is a regulating system to monitor and control such players in the market. Antitrust laws also prevent multiple firms from colluding or forming a cartel to limit competition through practices such as price fixing. Due to the complexity of deciding what practices will limit competition, antitrust law has become a distinct legal specialization.

Antitrust institutions are expected to ensure that antitrust acts and regulations are enforced in the right spirit so that there is a level playing field for the players in a given market. But it is observed that sometimes the big boys in the industry try to influence these institutions in multiple ways and, at times, the institutions become instruments for curtailing competition. They become puppets in the hands of the people who are more keen on subverting the competition in the market.<sup>33</sup> In their logic, all combinations are bad. Similarly, low pricing by a firm is a threat to the industry. They dismiss the fact that combinations can lead to economies of scale and hence a better price. Such groups see a problem in every solution. In short, antitrust institutions should think and act neutral if they want to be known as the protectors of fair competition in the market.

**Data Analysis and Findings**

Data analysis has been done using tables and charts. Bibliometric data analysis has been done using VOSViewer software. H-Indexes of the journals have been collected from Scimago Journal & Country Rank website.




Fig. 1 — Growth of publications on competition and anti-trust laws




Fig. 2 — Relationship between publication and citation (1980-2023)

Figure 1 shows the growth of publications on Competition and Antitrust Laws from 1980 to 2023. As can be observed from the above chart, publications in this area picked up from 2000 and there has been steady growth for the last two decades. This shows that competition is an important facet of business and governance and there has been lot of academic interest in the area. The fact that more than 102 countries have enacted laws to ensure fair competition in the market is a testimony that competition is a complicated subject and needs the attention of the government.

Figure 2 shows the growth of citations on the topic vis-à-vis publications across the globe. It is seen that the growth of citations has been unsteady compared to the publications. There has been a bi-directional fluctuation in the citations during 1980-2023. It is seen that there was a growth trend till 2012, and then there is a decline in the citations. One of the reasons for this decline in citations could be the changing nature of competition. Due to the growth of e-commerce and the adoption of technology in commercial transactions, competition is no longer limited to a specific territory and often has global connotations. Academic discourse on these

Table 1 — Top-20 cited authors based on citation/document

Authors	Count of Citations	Count of Documents	Citation/Document
Scharpf F.W.	690	2	345
Haw I.-M.; Hu B.; Hwang L.-S.; Wu W.	325	1	325
Drees J.M.; Heugens P.P.M.	317	1	317
Sexton R.J.; Kling C.L.; Carman H.F.	142	1	142
Gerber D.	139	1	139
Haralambides H.E.	137	1	137
De Hert P.; Papakonstantinou V.; Malgieri G.; Beslay L.; Sanchez I.	127	1	127
Tuori K.; Tuori K.	126	1	126
Haucap J.; Heimeshoff U.	116	1	116
Riahi-Belkaoui A.	114	1	114
Peeters T.; Szymanski S.	107	1	107
Starkie D.	304	3	101
Nielsen V.L.; Parker C.	91	1	91
Crouch C.; Le Galès P.	74	1	74
Liu S.; Yang Y.; Zhou Y.	74	1	74
Evenett S.J.; Levenstein M.C.; Suslow V.Y.	72	1	72
Evans D.S.; Padilla A.J.	67	1	67
Fahy N.; Hervey T.; Greer S.; Jarman H.; Stueckler D.; Galsworthy M.; McKee M.	65	1	65
Ezrachi A.; Stucke M.E.	63	1	63
Cameron P.D.	60	1	60

has not picked up, and hence there is less literature to cite.

Table 1 shows the top-20 authors in terms of citations. It is noticed that Scharpf F.W. is the most cited author (690 citations) with just two publications to his credit in the area of competition. It is interesting to note that the other highly cited authors have also published just a few documents. It can be concluded from this observation that the quality of these articles is very high and hence have been cited by scholars extensively.

Table 2 lists the authors who have been most productive and have written extensively on the subject. Dunne N (19), Drexel J.(17), and Gerber D.J.(16) are the top three authors. In terms of Citations/Document, Kaplow L leads with a score of 26, followed by Fox E.M. with a score of 11.

Figure 3 shows the co-authorship diagram. The most productive author(s) have been shown with bigger colored circles.

Tables 3 and 4 show the top publications in the area of competition and antitrust and the journals that published a large number of articles on the subject. The article titled “The European Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity” is the most cited (654) article. The Journal of European Competition Law and Practice published the maximum number of articles (213).

Table 2 — Top-20 cited authors based on documents published

Authors	Sum of Cited by	Publications	Citation/Document
Dunne N.	133	19	7
Drexel J.	117	17	7
Gerber D.J.	42	16	3
Lundqvist B.	63	14	5
Lianos I.	97	13	7
Monti G.	45	11	4
Andreangeli A.	43	11	4
Petr M.	4	11	0
Kaplow L.	264	10	26
Frenz W.	15	10	2
Ronzano A.	1	10	0
Fox E.M.	102	9	11
Colomo P.I.	28	9	3
Blažo O.	12	9	1
Maher I.	75	8	9
Nazzini R.	71	8	9
Zimmer D.	42	8	5
Rodger B.J.	40	8	5
Gal M.S.	35	8	4
Geradin D.	31	8	4

Table 5 and Fig. 4 shows country-wise publications in the area of competition and anti-trust. As can be seen UK, the USA, and Germany are the top three countries with the highest publications, citations, and




Fig. 3 — Co-Authorship diagram ( (Search criteria - min 5 documents and min 5 citations)

Table 3 — Top 20 cited articles in the area of competition and anti-trust laws

Year	Title	Source title	Cited by
2002	The European social model: Coping with the challenges of diversity	Journal of Common Market Studies	654
2004	Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra-legal institutions	Journal of Accounting Research	325
2013	Synthesizing and Extending Resource Dependence Theory: A Meta-Analysis	Journal of Management	317
1991	American journal of agricultural economics market integration, efficiency of arbitrage, and imperfect competition: Methodology and application to u.s. celery	American Journal of Agricultural Economics	142
2010	Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization	Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization	139
2002	Competition, Excess Capacity, and the Pricing of Port Infrastructure	International Journal of Maritime Economics	137
2002	Airport regulation and competition	Journal of Air Transport Management	129
2018	The right to data portability in the GDPR: Towards user-centric interoperability of digital services	Computer Law and Security Review	127
2012	The eurozone crisis: A constitutional analysis	The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis	126
2001	Reforming UK airport regulation	Journal of Transport Economics and Policy	125
2005	The Limits of Competition Law: Markets and Public Services	The Limits of Competition Law: Markets and Public Services	118

(Contd.)

Table 3 — Top 20 cited articles in the area of competition and anti-trust laws (Contd.)

Year	Title	Source title	Cited by
2004	Relationship between tax compliance internationally and selected determinants of tax morale	Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation	114
2014	Financial fair play in European football	Economic Policy	107
1998	Commission activism: Subsuming telecommunications and electricity under European competition law	Journal of European Public Policy	107
2010	Why (ever) define markets	Harvard Law Review	92
2009	Testing responsive regulation in regulatory enforcement	Regulation and Governance	91
2005	Abuse of market power	Economic Journal	75
2018	A Swarm Intelligence Algorithm-Lion Swarm Optimization;	Moshi Shibie yu Rengong Zhineng/Pattern Recognition and Artificial Intelligence	74

Table 4 — Top 20 Journals in the area of competition and anti-trust laws

Source title	Count of Source title	Sum of Cited by	Citation/ Document	H-Index
Journal of European Competition Law and Practice	213	440	2	12
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies	165	253	2	6
Concurrences	128	54	0	4
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement	128	517	4	10
IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law	115	453	4	20
European Competition Journal	109	347	3	12
World Competition	97	175	2	6
Antitrust Bulletin	93	415	4	21
Journal of Competition Law and Economics	83	785	9	29
Global Competition Litigation Review	71	11	0	2
European Competition and Regulatory Law Review	68	56	1	4
Revue Internationale de Droit Economique	47	98	2	8
Competition Law Journal	46	13	0	2
Common Market Law Review	44	367	8	55
European Law Review	34	167	5	25
Revista de Defesa da Concorrenca	34	15	0	3
Market and Competition Law Review	33	39	1	3
Computer Law and Security Review	32	367	11	49
Review of Industrial Organization	29	165	6	62
Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice	28	82	3	13

Table 5 — Country-wise publications and citations (Min 5 documents and Min 5 citations)

Country	Documents	Citations	Total Link Strength
United Kingdom	832	4652	275
United States	490	3560	212
Germany	430	2547	132
Netherlands	311	2063	163
Belgium	296	1494	159
Italy	219	897	108
France	213	508	89
Australia	155	772	67
India	116	288	21
Poland	107	185	25

(Contd.)

Table 5 — Country-wise publications and citations (Min 5 documents and Min 5 citations) (Contd.)

Country	Documents	Citations	Total Link Strength
Switzerland	105	413	48
Spain	104	147	21
China	91	228	33
Japan	81	143	31
Austria	64	163	27
Brazil	61	39	18
Sweden	61	244	29
Hong Kong	54	561	38
Canada	52	260	28




Fig. 4 — Country-wise publications on competition and anti-trust laws




Fig. 5 — Bibliographic coupling of countries




Fig. 6 — Network Diagram of Keyword Distribution (10 times occurrence of the Author's keyword)

link strength. Link strength shows how much the authors of a country collaborated with the authors of other countries to do research and publish documents in a particular area of research. This is shown through bibliographic coupling in Fig. 5.

Figure 6 shows the keyword distribution of the Scopus-indexed documents on Competition and Anti-trust laws. The most frequently used keywords are competition law, antitrust, private enforcement, market power, Collusion, merger control, Intellectual Property, etc. Cartel formation is witnessed in the Oligopoly market structure. These two terms are also cited frequently. Other terms like consumer welfare, economic development, regulation, liberalization, etc have also been quoted by the authors.

### Conclusion

Business and Commerce are no longer limited to the geographical boundaries of a country. The industry of every country has to compete with foreign players and has to win in the market fairly. Therefore, there have to be proper rules and regulations so that each player can compete fairly. Considering this need, more than 102 countries have enacted laws to ensure fair competition in the

market. Competition is good for the consumers. They get better products with lower prices and favorable terms when there is competition in the market. Often, players in the market try to outsmart others by anti-competitive methods, and that is not good for the consumers. They distort the market forces and disrupt the level playing field for the players. Antitrust laws and antitrust policies are essential to guard against such acts from the players in the market, particularly those who are very big and have monopolistic tendencies. In addition to business in the real world, a lot of business is now taking place in the virtual world. This new world has no physical boundary and has no clear demarcation of jurisdiction. While the courts of different countries have tried to interpret the concept of “Relevant market”, there is a lot of ambiguity. Therefore, there is a need for international competition law that can settle disputes between parties located in different countries and are into cross-country business transactions. Another issue that needs a lot of attention is the IPR regime in different countries and how that impacts the competition in the market. IPR Laws are necessary to promote innovation, but they should not become a tool in the hands of a few to dictate the market.

## References

- 1 Bonanno, G, Game Theory, Third Edition, ISBN-13: 978-1983604638, [https://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bonanno/PDF/GT\\_book.pdf](https://faculty.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/bonanno/PDF/GT_book.pdf).
- 2 himomura K I & Thisse J F, Competition among the big and the small, *The RAND Journal of Economics*, 43 (2) (2012) 329, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41723331>.
- 3 Leitzinger J J & Tamor K L, Foreign competition in antitrust law, *The Journal of Law & Economics*, 26 (1) (1983) 87, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/725186>.
- 4 Grossack I M, OPEC and the antitrust laws, *Journal of Economic Issues*, 20 (3) (1986) 725, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4225751>.
- 5 Saurabh S, The economics of antitrust competition: An international perspective, *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 21 (2) (2017) 86, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48531465>.
- 6 Bradford A, Antitrust law in global markets, Research handbook on the economics of antitrust law, Einer Elhauge, Ed., Edward Elgar Publishing (2012), [https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty\\_scholarship/](https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/) 1976.
- 7 Blythe M A, The extraterritorial impact of the anti-trust laws: Protecting British trading interests, *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 31 (1) (1983) 99, <https://doi.org/10.2307/839608>.
- 8 Bhattacharjea A, India's Competition Policy: An Assessment, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 38 (34) (2003) 3561, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4413938>
- 9 Feuer M, The Patent Monopoly and the Anti-Trust Laws, *Columbia Law Review*, 38 (7) (1938) 1145, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1116827>.
- 10 Callmann R, The essence of anti-trust, *Columbia Law Review*, 49 (8) (1949) 1100, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1118912>.
- 11 Deepak J S, Patents and competition law: identifying jurisdictional metes and bounds in the Indian context, *National Law School of India Review*, 27 (2) (2015) 135, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44283653>.
- 12 First HE excessive drug pricing as an antitrust violation, *Antitrust Law Journal*, 82 (2) (2019) 701, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27006803>.
- 13 Chen Y, Refusal to deal, intellectual property rights, and antitrust, *Journal of Law, Economics & Organization*, 30 (3) (2014) 533, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43774356>.
- 14 Khan L M, Amazon's Anti-Trust Paradox, *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol 126, (2016-2017), <https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-paradox?ref=hackernoon.com>.
- 15 KHAN L M, Amazon's antitrust paradox, *The Yale law journal*, 126 (3) (2017) 710, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44863332>.
- 16 Lopatka J E & Page W H, antitrust on internet time: Microsoft and the law and economics of exclusion, *Supreme Court Economic Review*, 7 (1999) 157, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147089>.
- 17 Bhatia J & Palepu A R, Reliance Jio: Predatory pricing or predatory behaviour?, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 51 (41) (2016) 33, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44165786>.
- 18 Giocoli N, Games judges don't play: Predatory pricing and strategic reasoning in US antitrust, *Supreme Court Economic Review*, 21 (1) (2014) 271, <https://doi.org/10.1086/675271>.
- 19 Javits B A, The anti-trust laws, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 149 (1930) 128, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1017445>.
- 20 Hylton K N & Deng F, Antitrust around the world: An empirical analysis of the scope of competition laws and their effects, *Antitrust Law Journal*, 74 (2) (2007) 271, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27897550>.
- 21 Antitrust sites worldwide, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-sites-worldwide>.
- 22 Stigler G J, The origin of the sherman act, *The Journal of Legal Studies*, 14 (1) (1985) 1, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/724314>.
- 23 Bhattacharjea A, Of omissions and commissions: India's competition laws, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 45 (35) (2010) 31, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25742019>.
- 24 Sethi R & Dhir S, Anti-competitive agreements under the Competition Act, 2002, *National Law School of India Review*, 24 (2) (2013) 32, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44283760>.
- 25 Malik P, Malhotra N, Tamarappoo R & Uberoi N K, legal treatment of abuse of dominance in Indian competition law: Adopting an effects-based approach, *Review of Industrial Organization*, 54 (2) (2019) 435, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48702964>.
- 26 Kabir A, Competition laws and the Indian economy, *National Law School of India Review*, 23 (1) (2011) 1, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44283735>.
- 27 Chauhan B S, Indian competition law: Global context, *Journal of the Indian Law Institute*, 54 (3) (2012) 315, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44782475>.
- 28 Bhattacharjea A & De O, Cartels and the competition commission, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 47 (35) (2012) 14, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41720077>.
- 29 Bhattacharjea A, De O & Gouri G, Competition law and competition policy in India: How the competition commission has dealt with anticompetitive restraints by government entities, *Review of Industrial Organization*, 54 (2) (2019) 221, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48702957>.
- 30 Ghosal V & Sokol D D, The evolution of U.S. cartel enforcement, *The Journal of Law & Economics*, 57 (S3) (2014) S51–S65, <https://doi.org/10.1086/676070>.
- 31 Goldberg L G, The effect of conglomerate mergers on competition, *The Journal of Law & Economics*, 16 (1) (1973) 137, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/724829>
- 32 Becker G S, Competition and democracy, *The Journal of Law & Economics*, 1 (1985) 105, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/724885>,
- 33 Baumol W J & Ordover J A, Use of antitrust to subvert competition, *The Journal of Law & Economics*, 28 (2) (1985) 247, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/725521>.